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Assessing the Impact of Trade Policy Changes. Does Market Structure Matter?  
 
1. Introduction  
International markets of agricultural products are often highly concentrated. There are several 
example of markets - cereals, sugar, bananas or coffee - in which few trading firms (private or 
not) account for a significant share of world trade. While a considerable body of literature has 
addressed the issue of concentration in the food and retailing industries and its consequences 
in terms of market power, not many studies have focused on the structure and behavior of 
firms trading agricultural products in international markets; in fact, there are few empirical 
studies and they are not recent. However, for more than twenty years, there has been a 
growing consensus that the assumption of perfect competition may often be restrictive 
(McCorriston, 2002). Yet, empirical agricultural trade policy analysis mostly relies on the 
assumption of perfect competition.  
The aim of this paper is to address the relevance of the assumptions about market 
structure and firms behavior in empirical analyses of agricultural trade policies. The paper 
focuses on the most recent changes in the European Union (EU) import regime for bananas, 
namely the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the December 2009 WTO 
agreement. This is a good case study to assess to what extent non competitive behaviors 
matter when evaluating the effects of trade policies. In fact, the banana trading industry is 
among the most evident examples of high concentration in international markets, with three 
multinational firms accounting for almost 65% of world trade (Arias et al., 2003; Bananalink, 
2011). Recently, the EU Commission (EC, 2008) has found that four banana traders - namely, 
Chiquita, Del Monte, Dole and Weichert - have violated EU rules on competition, and 
imposed fines on them which amounted to 60 million euro. On the other hand, for several 
decades the EU import regime for bananas has been the cause of heated political 
confrontation, both domestically and internationally (Josling and Taylor, 2003). In July 2008 
the longest ever meeting in WTO negotiations history failed to reach any agreement to 
conclude the Doha round, but  in the course of these negotiations eleven Latin American 
countries, the US and the EU reached a tentative provisional agreement to bring an end to the 
long-standing WTO “banana war”. However, the failure of the Doha round meeting left the 
banana dispute unresolved. In December 2009 the same countries signed an agreement along 
the lines of what had been agreed 18 months previously. Meanwhile, on 1 January 2008  the 
EU implemented the EPAs, progressively removing barriers to trade between the EU and 
regional groupings of ACP countries. For bananas the EPAs have meant the removal of the 
duty-free 775,000 t quota for imports originating from ACP countries. It is expected that 
bananas, sugar and rice will be for ACP countries the agricultural commodities that will 
benefit most from the EPAs.  
The paper provides a quantitative assessment, under different assumptions about market 
structure, first of the impact of the trade preferences the EU granted ACP countries with the 
EPAs, and then of the erosion of these preferences through the reduction of the MFN import 
tariff for bananas under the December 2009 WTO agreement. We use a single commodity, 
spatial, mathematical programming model. Following Samuelson (1952) and Takayama and 
Judge (1971) a  “quasi-welfare” function is maximized subject to a set of constraints. The 
paper develops two modified versions of the Takayama and Judge (1971) spatial trade model: 
the extreme case of international trading firms jointly maximizing their profits by forming a 
cartel and the intermediate case of traders behaving as downstream oligopolists and upstream 
oligopsonists. A two-step calibration procedure is used to make the models replicate observed 2 
 
trade data; this allows to address a very relevant issue, that is, which market structure is 
compatible with observed data. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the model, the calibration 
procedure used and the outcomes in terms of feasible market structures; the third discusses the 
results, while the final section offers concluding remarks.  
2. The model  
The model is a modified and updated version of the one used in Anania (2010) to allow for 
different non competitive market structures; its data base has been updated and the shifting 
over time of supply functions as a result of technical changes has been modified to take into 
account, in addition to expected changes in yields, the effects on land allocation for banana 
production. It is a single commodity, spatial, partial equilibrium, mathematical programming 
model; an objective function is maximized subject to a set of constraints describing relevant 
demand and supply functions, price linkages (due, for example, to transportation costs and 
policy interventions) and policies which cannot be represented through exogenously 
determined price wedges (such as import quotas). The model includes five sources of 
domestic supply within the EU, fourteen exporting and four importing countries/regions.
 
Import demand and export supply functions, as well as domestic supply functions in the EU, 
are assumed to be linear, or to be well approximated by linear functions in the relevant 
portions for the simulations conducted. Production functions in the EU and import demand 
and export supply functions in other countries/regions in the base year are obtained from 
observed produced, imported and exported quantities, observed production, import and export 
prices, and supply, export supply and import demand price elasticities at the equilibrium in 
each country/region. The values of the elasticities used are exogenous to the model and are 
based on those used elsewhere (Anania, 2010; Arias et al., 2005; Guyomard et al., 1999a and 
1999b; Kersten, 1995; and Vanzetti et al., 2005).
1 Net imports, net exports and average 
import and export unit values have been computed on the basis of information from the 
COMTRADE and FAOSTAT databases. Data for Martinique and Guadalupe, Canary Islands, 
Madeira and Azores, and Crete are based on information from the European Commission.  
The modeling of the EU-27 import regime in 2007 includes:
2 
(a) for bananas originating in MFN countries, the “tariff only” import regime introduced in 
2006 (the import tariff equals 176 €/t); 
(b) for bananas originating in ACP countries, a 775,000 t TRQ, with duty-free in-quota 
imports and out-of-quota imports subject to the MFN tariff (176 €/t);  
(c) for bananas originating in LDCs, unlimited duty-free imports.  
For the US and the “Rest of the world net importers” the model includes the tariffs 
applied in 2007.  
In order to assess how the simulation of the effects of policy changes are affected when 
the assumption that markets are perfectly competitive is relaxed, we consider two other  
                                                            
1 The basic structure of the model is provided in Anania (2010). Observed produced, imported and exported 
quantities, observed production, import and export prices, and supply, export supply and import demand price 
elasticities are not reported here due to the space constraint.  
2 The 2006 reform of the EU domestic policy regime for bananas “decoupled” support for banana producers 
outside the “outermost regions” of the EU moving it into the “single farm payment” introduced with the 2003 
Fischler reform; this means that banana production in Greece, Cyprus and continental Portugal is driven by 
market forces only, while in the “outermost regions” (France; Spain; Azores and Madeira in Portugal) different 
regimes apply. 3 
 
market structures: (a) the extreme case of international trading firms jointly maximizing their 
profits by forming a cartel exerting monopsony power in their relations with exporters and 
monopoly power with respect to importers; and (b) the intermediate case of traders behaving 
as downstream oligopolists and upstream oligopsonists, considering different degrees of 
imperfect competition. The possibility of exerting market power is limited only to the firms 
active in the international trading of bananas. 
In the 2007 base model the reference scenario with perfectly competitive markets is 
modeled by maximizing a standard “quasi-welfare” function (Samuelson, 1952; Takayama 
and Judge, 1971): 
                               q
d
j                              q
s
i 
      Max W (xin , xqie , xmfnie )    =   j    p
d
j(m) dm    -  i   p
s
i(r) dr    -               
                                                                    0                    0 
                               -  i j (TCij xij) - i e (xmfnie TMFNie ) - i n (xin Tin )  ,      (1)        
subject to a set of constraints, where: i is an index for exporting countries and for sources of 
domestic supply in the EU; j is an index for importing countries; e is an index for EU15 and 
EU12; n is an index for non-EU importing countries; p
d
j (m) is country j’s inverse import 
demand function; p
s
i (r) is country i’s inverse export supply function; q
d
j are country j’s total 
imports; q
s
i are country i’s total exports; Tin is the per unit import tariff imposed by country n 
on its imports from country i ; TCij is the per unit international transaction cost for shipments 
from country i to country j (border to border); TMFNie is the MFN import tariff imposed by 
EU member states e on their imports from country i (it applies to imports from MFN 
importers and on out-of-quota imports from ACP countries); xij is the trade flow from country 
i to country j;  xmfnie is the trade flow from country i to EU member states e subject to the 
MFN import tariff; and xqie is the trade flow from country i to EU member states e within the 
preferential duty-free TRQ for ACP countries. 
The first non-competitive behavior considered is a cartel, that is, the presence of a 
number of colluding firms which maximize joint profits; this stylizes the EU Commission’s 
(EC, 2008) detection of the existence of a stable cartel among banana traders in Northern 
European Union countries. We assume that colluding traders are able to exert market power 
upstream as well as downstream; thus, the cartel is assumed to exert monopsony power with 
respect to banana exporters and monopoly power with respect to importers. This market 
structure is modeled by maximizing traders’ total profits, given by total revenues across all 
importing countries minus international transaction costs, banana acquisition costs and tariff 
expenditure: 
Max Π (xin , xqie , xmfnie ) = i j ( p
d
j  - p
s
i - TCij ) xij – i e (xmfnie TMFNie )  
                   - i n (xin Tin )  .                    (2) 
 
In between perfect competition and the cartel, a range of possible non-competitive 
behaviors are introduced in the model by considering different mark-up values. The mark-up 
is defined as: 





                                                     (3)      4 
 








   be the conjecture that 
firm i has on the impact that a change in its output  i X  has on the sum of the outputs chosen 
by each of its rivals, j X . If firms are symmetric, it can be shown (Shapiro, 1992) that:  






                     (4) 
with  i s being the market share of each firm i and  the demand elasticity. 
Under Cournot behavior the conjectural parameter is equal to 0; when firms are price 
takers the conjectural parameter is equal to -1 and the mark-up is zero.  Under a cartel 





We model firm oligopolistic/oligopsonist behaviors by considering different 
percentages of mark-up. The values of mark-up under three benchmark market behaviors - 
perfect competition or Bertrand (under which, if the product is homogeneous, the mark-up is 
zero), Cournot and a cartel - are reported in table 1 for two different values of the demand 
elasticity (assuming firms sell bananas on one market only) and under different market 
structures. We believe that only those in the central columns, that is, a number of (identical) 
firms equal to 11, 7 and 5,  appear to be plausible representations for the world banana trading 
industry. In our modeling exercise different mark-up values are considered, ranging from 3% 
to 25%. With the lower value of elasticity, a mark-up equal to 3% is consistent with behaviors 
that are close to perfect competition. A mark-up equal to 12% corresponds to conjectures that 
are close to Cournot only when there are more than 16 firms, which is a rather implausible 
hypothesis for the banana trading industry. However, with a higher elastiticity a mark-up 
equal to 12% corresponds to Cournot if there are 11 firms.  Higher values of mark-up, such as 
20%, correspond to an industry which is less competitive than Cournot; this occurs if there are 
more than 10 and 6 firms, under the lower and higher elasticity value assumptions, 
respectively.    
This third market structure is modeled by maximizing a “quasi-welfare” function 
(Takayama and Judge, 1971) modified to include trading firm profits calculated using the 
mark-up:    
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where  MUij  is the per unit profit on shipments from exporter i to importer j obtained by 
applying the (exogenously determined) percentage of mark-up to total per unit costs, specific 
to that trade flow, incurred by the trader (acquisition price + international transaction cost).
3  
                                                            
3 Spatial models which include imperfectly competitive market structures and assume, as we do, a perfectly 
homogeneous product have been proposed by Takayama and Judge (1971), Kawaguchi, Suzuki and Kaiser 
(1997) and Yang et al. (2002). Our model differs from these models mainly because market power is here 
exerted by middlemen and because, by introducing the value of mark-up, we model a range of possible market 5 
 
One characteristic of mathematical programming spatial models is that predicted 
bilateral trade flows show an overspecialization with respect to those observed, i.e. the 
solution includes a smaller number of non-zero trade flows than those observed. This is the  
result of the optimization procedure used as well as the inability of the constraints included in 
the model to fully represent the complexity of the market under scrutiny, because of both the 
poor quality of available information and the simplified representation in the model of market 
agent behaviors. In models like the one developed in this paper the information which appears 
weaker is the matrix of bilateral international transaction costs. In our model these have been 
generated from available industry information on international transaction costs for few 
specific bilateral trade flows, using distances between countries to explain differences in the 
variable component of transaction costs. The two step calibration procedure proposed by Paris 
et al. (2010) has been used to make up for the poor quality of per unit transaction costs and 
improve the capacity of the base model to reproduce observed net trade positions as well as 
bilateral trade flows. Essentially, information regarding the observed market equilibrium is 
used to infer the errors in international transaction costs which, once corrected, make the 
model perfectly calibrate observed country net trade positions.
4 In the first step the model is 
augmented by a set of constraints imposing predicted bilateral trade flows to equal observed 
ones. The values of the dual variables associated in the solution to these constraints are then 
used in step two to correct per unit international transaction costs. The solution of the model 
in step two perfectly replicates observed country net trade positions; in general there are 
multiple optimal sets of bilateral trade flows associated to observed net trade positions, 
observed trade flows being one of these sets (Paris et al., 2010).  
When the model assuming a cartel maximizing joint profits is calibrated, even setting 
the per unit transaction cost equal zero is not sufficient to make the model generate the 
observed market equilibrium. An adjustment of transaction costs to make them negative is 
needed for the model to reproduce the observed market equilibrium; this would mean traders 
receiving for each unit of bananas traded a “subsidy” which exceeds transaction cost. This 
implies that the hypothesis of traders forming a cartel that acts as a monopolist and a 
monopsonist in the world market for bananas turns out to be unfeasible, being inconsistent 
with observed quantities traded and importer and exporter border prices. In fact, the 
downward adjustments of transaction costs needed to calibrate the model range between 754 
and 2,710 US$/t and the resulting corrected transaction costs between -553 and -2,600 US$/t.  
This result may not come as a surprise, given that a world cartel, even for the banana 
market, is a rather extreme situation. However, the findings for the other imperfectly 
competitive market structures are less predictable. Indeed, a similar outcome also emerges for 
imperfectly competitive world market structures with a mark-up above 12%. Even when the 
mark-up was set equal to 12% calibrating the model made two corrected transaction costs be 
negative; however, in this case their values were judged to be within the range of possible 
measurement errors in border prices (the largest one in absolute value was – 12 US$/t). We 
conclude that market structures with international traders acting as non-cooperative 
oligopolists/oligopsonists with a resulting mark-up exceeding 12% are unfeasible in the 
banana market, being largely inconsistent with observed border prices and quantities traded. 
These results crucially depend on the assumptions made regarding the imperfectly 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
structures and do not impose a specific mode of competition. Only few papers have assessed the impact of  
banana policy changes by assuming  imperfectly competitive market structures;  McCorriston and Sheldon 
(1996) and  McCorriston (2000)  have used a non-spatial vertically-related market model in which 
oligopoly/oligopsony is assumed at each stage. 
4 The calibration procedure implicitly assumes that the only potentially ill-measured information in the model is 
bilateral international transaction costs. 6 
 
competitive structures of the banana market. For example, we assume that only international 
traders are in the position to exert market power. If this assumption is relaxed and it is 
assumed instead that actors operating downstream (such as retailers) hold market power, our 
results may no longer hold true.  
3. Results  
All the simulations have been generated with reference to 2019, the earliest time horizon for 
the completion of the implementation of the December 2009 WTO agreement, assuming that 
no agreement on the modalities in agriculture in the DDA round is reached by the end of 
2013.  
The “2019 base” reference model has been obtained from the “2007 base” by modeling 
changes in production, import demand and export supply functions in all countries/regions as 
a result of expected shifts in domestic demand and supply functions. Import demand and 
export supply functions shift according to expected changes, ceteris paribus, in quantities 
produced and consumed in each country/region.
5 Consumption is assumed to vary over time 
on the basis of observed changes in population and per capita incomes (in constant terms) 
between 1997 and 2007, and 1995-97 and 2005-07, respectively. Banana production in each 
country/region is assumed to change over time, ceteris paribus, in line with observed changes 
in production due to technical changes between 1995-1997 and 2005-2007.  
The results of the simulations are presented in tables 2 and 3. Five different market 
structures, found to be feasible given observed traded quantities and prices, have been 
considered: perfect competition and oligopoly/oligopsony with mark-up percentages equal to 
3%, 6%, 9% and 12%. The results for the “2007 base” scenario are the same for all of them, 
each of the five models being calibrated to reproduce the observed market equilibrium. Two 
policy scenarios in 2019 have been simulated in addition to the “base” reference one: a 
scenario in which only the EPAs are introduced, i.e. the EU removes its 775,000 t duty-free 
import quota on bananas originating in ACP countries and these may enter the EU duty-free 
and subject to no quantitative restriction, and a scenario in which, in addition to EPAs, the 
December 2009 WTO agreement is implemented, i.e. the MFN tariff imposed by the EU 
drops from 176€/t to 114€/t (import tariffs imposed by other countries remain unchanged).
6 
The simulation results obtained under the five market structures appear fairly close 
(table 2). This comes as no surprise, given the relatively low degrees of market power which 
have been found to be feasible and have been considered in the analysis. However, 
differences among the results obtained under the various market structures become more 
evident when percentage changes are considered (table 3).     
Under all market structures the implementation of the EPAs is expected to generate 
consistent benefits for ACP countries, whose total exports increase by about 80% and export 
revenue triples, while MFN and LDC exports and export prices decline and imports by 
countries different from the EU increase; significant trade diversion occurs, with ACP exports 
                                                            
5  The FAOSTAT data base is the source used for production and apparent consumption (domestic production + 
imports – exports) in 2007.  
6 It may be useful to underline at the outset that the results under the five market structures should not be 
compared directly, as the models which generate them differ, not only in the assumptions made regarding the 
market structure, but in other crucial parameters as well. In particular they differ in the per unit transaction costs, 
because of the differences in the results of the calibration procedure for the five models; in fact, corrected 
transaction costs become smaller and smaller as we move from perfect competition to increasing degrees of 
market power. 7 
 
previously directed to non-EU countries now being redirected toward the latter, and a 
consistent share of exports by MFN countries being diverted in the opposite direction. The 
higher the percentage of mark-up, the higher tend to be percentage changes; this is so because 
calibrated transaction costs decline with the percentage of mark-up, with the effect of 
accentuating the impact of the policy change. The most significant differences in trade flows 
between the results obtained under the five market structures relate to LDC exports. Under 
perfect competition, in the 2019 base scenario and in the scenario with the EPAs only all their 
exports are directed towards the EU, and they decline by 7.1% when the EPAs are 
implemented; when the imperfectly competitive market structures are assumed, LDC do not 
export to the EU in the 2019 base scenario, but find it profitable to do so when the EPAs are 
implemented, with their exports declining by between 4 and 6%, less than forecast under the 
perfect competition scenario. What happens here is that the profitability of LDC exports to the 
EU and the Rest of the world markets is very close and the reduction of the import price in the 
latter (because of the outward shift in the export supply towards them by MFN countries) 
makes exporting to the former more profitable, although LDC are now able to export less.  
The increases in the degree of market power make the sign of the expected change for 
some crucial variables switch. This is the case for the EU import price, and, as a consequence, 
for EU consumption and imports. This result is driven by the fact that EPAs, on the one hand, 
make ACP exports on the EU market more competitive, but, on the other, ACP export prices 
being larger than MFN ones, and per unit profits on ACP exports being larger than those on 
MFN exports, pushes EU import price for bananas upward. When this effect, which increases 
the larger the percentage of mark-up, overcomes the effect in the opposite direction of the 
partial liberalization of banana imports, the EU price increases. This leads us to conclude that 
as the degree of market power increases,  market structure matters not only in terms of the 
expected magnitude of the impact of policy changes on the different agents involved, but in 
terms of its sign as well. 
Firms’ profits increase with the introduction of the EPAs. Again, ACP are less efficient 
banana producers and show significantly higher export prices than MFN exporters; this makes 
the positive effect on firms’ profits of increased ACP exports and export prices overcome the 
effect in the opposite direction of lower MFN and LDC exports and export prices.  
When the implementation of the December 2009 WTO agreement is simulated (in 
addition to the EPAs), the effects of the preference erosion for ACP exports are marked and 
of the same order of magnitude under all market structures. ACP banana exports, all still 
directed to the EU, decline by around 15%, while MFN exports increase by 3.6%; those 
directed to the EU expand by over 90%, as trade diversion occurs in addition to trade creation. 
The increase in import prices in non-EU markets and the decline of EU import price cause 
LDC exports to be redirected from the EU to the Rest of the world; thanks to the lower 
transaction costs to this destination compared to the EU, LDC exports increase by 1%. The 
2009 WTO agreement causes a decline in firms’ profits, although by 2% only, because of the 
lower volume of ACP exports, which are more profitable for the traders than MFN ones; in 
addition, the decline in profits comes from the negative effects on per unit profits of the lower 
imports by the US and the Rest of the world, and those, of the opposite sign, of the larger 
volume of EU imports and higher export prices in MFN and LDC countries. While the EPAs 
produced little change in the EU domestic market, the WTO agreement causes the EU 
domestic price to decline by around 10%, consumption to increase by 5% and imports to 
increase by a little more than 5%; on the contrary, EU production changes very little, as EU 
domestic policy for bananas makes only production in Greece, Portugal and Cyprus (which 
jointly account for a very small share of EU banana production) react to market signals. For 8 
 
the reasons discussed above, the magnitude of percentage changes in market equilibrium 
increases with the percentage of mark-up and firms’ market power. 
  The overall impact of the EPAs and the WTO agreement with respect to the “2019 
base”, which is reported in the five columns at the right end of table 3, shows that  the 
reduction of the preferential margin due to the WTO agreement does not cancel out the 
benefits to ACP countries from the EPAs; when the WTO agreement is implemented their 
exports and export revenues remain significantly above those in the base scenario (by more 
than 50 and 110%, respectively). Analogously, despite the trade creation effect of the 
reduction from 176 to 114 €/t of their relevant tariff , MFN countries are not able to fully 
recover from the loss of competitiveness vis a vis ACP countries which results from the EPAs 
and their exports and export revenue remain slightly below those in the base scenario.  
4. Conclusions  
The goal of this paper was to address the importance of the assumptions made about market 
structure and firm behaviors in empirical trade policy analysis with respect to recent changes 
in the EU import regime for bananas. We believe the paper’s contribution to unraveling this 
issue is threefold: it develops two original models which incorporate imperfectly competitive 
market structures in a spatial modeling framework; it provides an assessment of the degree of 
market power in international banana trade and, finally, it assesses how the expected effects 
of the most recent EU import regimes for bananas are affected by the assumptions made on 
the prevailing market structure.       
The paper develops two modified versions of the Takayama and Judge (1971) spatial 
trade model.  The first model includes a profit maximizing cartel of the firms which handle 
international trade. The second model incorporates oligopolistic and oligopsonistic behaviors 
of trading firms through a mark-up; this modeling framework has the advantage of being 
flexible, easy to implement and does not require identification of each firm’s conjectural 
variation parameters, which would imply making explicit assumptions about the number and 
symmetry of relevant firms in each importing market. The percentage of mark-up provides a 
representation of the degree of market power without having to make too restrictive 
assumptions about the nature of competition.  
The two step calibration procedure used to make the model replicate observed country 
net trade positions provided insights on a relevant issue, that is: what is the degree of market 
power in the world market for bananas? Indeed, the result of the analysis presented in the 
paper is that some market structures hypothesized turn out to be unfeasible, being largely 
inconsistent with observed traded quantities and border prices. This happens when a cartel 
maximizing firms’ joint profits is assumed, but also for imperfectly competitive world market 
structures where the  mark-up is above 12%.  In fact, the results show that observed data are 
only consistent with market behaviors which are far away from Cournot and, actually, are 
close to perfect competition under most of the values of demand elasticities and market shares  
here considered. This result appears even more important  given the high concentration of 
international trade of bananas.   
The implementation of the EPAs is expected to increase ACP exports to the EU 
significantly and generate overall consistent benefits for ACP countries; trade diversion 
occurs, with ACP exports previously directed to non-EU countries now being redirected 
toward the latter. The 2009 WTO agreement significantly reduces the preferential margin for 
ACP countries, but does not offset the benefits from the EPAs; as a whole, with both the 
EPAs and the WTO agreement in place, ACP countries are better off in terms of both exports 9 
 
and export revenues. Analogously, despite the trade creation effect of the lower tariff they 
face on the EU market, the WTO agreement does not compensate MFN countries for the loss 
of competitiveness vis a vis ACP countries as a result of the EPAs. Given the relatively low 
level of market power, simulation results are quite similar across the five market structures 
considered. However, the results show that as the feasible degree of market power increases, 
market structure matters not only in terms of the expected magnitude of the impact on the 
different agents involved, but in terms of its sign as well.  
The findings of this paper, especially those concerning the degree of market power in 
the world market for bananas,  depend upon a number of assumptions, common to most 
empirical studies on bananas, the most important of which include that: bananas are a 
homogeneous product; banana traders do not extend their activities downstream, into 
importing and ripening, or upstream, into producing and exporting bananas; actors different 
from the firms operating in international trading (importers and, even more important, 
retailers) have no market power; the policy changes considered have no effect on firm 
behaviors and market structure.  The removal of any of the above is likely to skew the results 
reached in this paper; however, this would imply the use of a completely different modeling 
framework and data needs which would be difficult to satisfy.    
In conclusion, notwithstanding its limitations, we believe this paper does provide useful 
insights for the empirical analysis of trade policy effects in imperfectly competitive markets.             
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Table 1: Mark-up values under different market structures 
20 16 11 7 5 3
ε=0.5
Perfect c o m p e t i t i o n / B e r t r a n d 000000
Cournot‐Nash 10 12.5 18 28.6 40 66.7
Cartel 200 200 200 200 200 200
ε=0.75
Perfect c o m p e t i t i o n / B e r t r a n d 000000
Cournot‐Nash 6.7 8.3 12.1 19.0 26.7 44.4
























EU production (000 t) 626 575 574 572 574 574 572 574 574 572 574 574 572 574 574 572
EU consumption (000 t) 5.304 6.415 6.451 6.753 6.441 6.451 6.762 6.470 6.451 6.771 6.498 6.451 6.781 6.572 6.451 6.790
EU15 border price (euro) 616,1 600,6 593,9 536,5 596,0 593,8 534,8 591,0 593,8 533,1 586,1 593,8 531,4 571,9 593,7 529,7
EU imports (000 t) 4.678 5.840 5.876 6.181 5.867 5.877 6.190 5.895 5.876 6.199 5.924 5.877 6.208 5.998 5.877 6.217
EU imports from ACP (000 t) 855 950 2.433 2.068 923 2.407 2.041 896 2.381 2.016 867 2.357 1.992 864 2.335 1.970
EU imports from MFN (000 t) 3.823 3.448 2.103 4.113 4.944 2.126 4.149 5.000 2.148 4.183 5.057 2.169 4.216 5.134 2.188 4.247
EU imports from LDC (000 t) 0 1.443 1.340 0 0 1.344 0 0 1.347 0 0 1.351 0 0 1.354 0
USA imports (000 t) 3.544 4.440 4.486 4.454 4.436 4.487 4.454 4.434 4.488 4.453 4.433 4.489 4.453 4.466 4.490 4.453
ROW imports (000 t) 7.250 7.949 8.095 7.994 7.937 8.099 7.993 7.932 8.102 7.993 7.928 8.105 7.992 8.051 8.108 7.991
ACP total exports (000 t) 935 1.353 2.433 2.068 1.328 2.407 2.041 1.302 2.381 2.016 1.274 2.357 1.992 1.275 2.335 1.970
MFN total exports (000 t) 14.454 15.434 14.684 15.205 15.514 14.712 15.236 15.556 14.738 15.265 15.601 14.762 15.293 15.802 14.786 15.320
LDC total exports (000 t) 83 1.443 1.340 1.356 1.398 1.344 1.360 1.404 1.347 1.364 1.410 1.351 1.368 1.437 1.354 1.371
ACP export revenue (mill US$) 331,1 489,5 1.449,0 1.066,7 474,0 1.419,9 1.042,0 458,7 1.392,7 1.019,1 443,1 1.367,4 997,8 444,4 1.343,7 977,9
MFN export revenue (mill US$) 3.642,1 3.758,6 3.443,2 3.661,0 3.793,3 3.454,4 3.674,0 3.811,6 3.465,1 3.686,5 3.830,8 3.475,3 3.698,3 3.918,9 3.485,0 3.709,8
LDC export revenue (mill US$) 16,9 289,4 256,2 261,2 274,7 257,4 262,5 276,6 258,5 263,8 278,6 259,6 265,0 287,7 260,6 266,2
Traders' profits (mill US$) 0,0 0,0 0,0 250,1 289,1 282,6 484,1 561,6 548,6 703,6 819,0 799,5 693,0 1.062,4 1.036,4
Table 2 ‐ Simulation results.
2007 base


































EU production (000 t) ‐0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 ‐0,3 ‐0,3 ‐0,3 ‐0,3 ‐0,3 ‐0,5 ‐0,3 ‐0,3 ‐0,3 ‐0,3
EU consumption (000 t) 0,6 0,2 ‐0,3 ‐0,7 ‐1,8 4,7 4,8 5,0 5,1 5,3 5,3 5,0 4,7 4,4 3,3
EU15 border price (euro) ‐1,1 ‐0,4 0,5 1,3 3,8 ‐9,7 ‐9,9 ‐10,2 ‐10,5 ‐10,8 ‐10,7 ‐10,3 ‐9,8 ‐9,3 ‐7,4
EU imports (000 t) 0,6 0,2 ‐0,3 ‐0,8 ‐2,0 5,2 5,3 5,5 5,6 5,8 5,8 5,5 5,2 4,8 3,7
EU imports from ACP (000 t) 156,1 160,8 165,7 171,9 170,3 ‐15,0 ‐15,2 ‐15,3 ‐15,5 ‐15,6 117,7 121,1 125,0 129,8 128,0
EU imports from MFN (000 t) ‐39,0 ‐57,0 ‐57,0 ‐57,1 ‐57,4 95,6 95,2 94,7 94,4 94,1 19,3 ‐16,1 ‐16,3 ‐16,6 ‐17,3
EU imports from LDC (000 t) ‐7 , 1 ……… …‐100,0 ‐100,0 ‐100,0 ‐100,0 ‐100,0 ‐100,0 … … … …
USA imports (000 t) 1,0 1,1 1,2 1,3 0,5 ‐0,7 ‐0,7 ‐0,8 ‐0,8 ‐0,8 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,5 ‐0,3
ROW imports (000 t) 1,8 2,0 2,1 2,2 0,7 ‐1,2 ‐1,3 ‐1,3 ‐1,4 ‐1,4 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,8 ‐0,7
ACP total exports (000 t) 79,8 81,3 82,9 85,0 83,1 ‐15,0 ‐15,2 ‐15,3 ‐15,5 ‐15,6 52,8 53,7 54,8 56,4 54,5
MFN total exports (000 t) ‐4,9 ‐5,2 ‐5,3 ‐5,4 ‐6,4 3,5 3,6 3,6 3,6 3,6 ‐1,5 ‐1,8 ‐1,9 ‐2,0 ‐3,1
LDC total exports (000 t) ‐7,1 ‐3,9 ‐4,1 ‐4,2 ‐5,8 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,3 1,3 ‐6,0 ‐2,7 ‐2,8 ‐3,0 ‐4,6
ACP export revenue (mill US$) 196,0 199,6 203,6 208,6 202,4 ‐26,4 ‐26,6 ‐26,8 ‐27,0 ‐27,2 117,9 119,8 122,2 125,2 120,0
MFN export revenue (mill US$) ‐8,4 ‐8,9 ‐9,1 ‐9,3 ‐11,1 6,3 6,4 6,4 6,4 6,5 ‐2,6 ‐3,1 ‐3,3 ‐3,5 ‐5,3
LDC export revenue (mill US$) ‐11,5 ‐6,3 ‐6,5 ‐6,8 ‐9,4 2,0 2,0 2,1 2,1 2,1 ‐9,7 ‐4,4 ‐4,6 ‐4,9 ‐7,5
Traders' profits (mill US$) 15,6 16,0 16,4 53,3 ‐2,2 ‐2,3 ‐2,4 ‐2,4 13,0 13,3 13,6 49,6
Table 3 ‐ Simulation results. Expected impact of policy changes under different market structures (% changes)
 'EPA only' vs. '2019 base'  'EPA + Dec 2009 Agreement' vs. 'EPA only'  'EPA + Dec 2009 Agreement' vs. '2019 base'
 